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INTRODUCTION 
As efforts to mitigate climate change have stalled over 
the past several decades, domestic and international focus 
has begun to shift towards adapting to its effects.1
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2014, Santa Clara University School of Law; B.S. 
2011, University of California Los Angeles. 
  Limiting 
carbon emissions to 500 parts per million, or nearly double 
 1. See, e.g., Richard Black, Climate Change Advisers Urge UK to Prepare 
for Change, BBC NEWS (Sept. 15, 2010, 9:18 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/ 
news/science-environment-11322929. 
BRANSON FINAL 5/16/2014  5:57 PM 
164 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54 
preindustrial concentrations, requires overcoming substantial 
political obstacles.2  As time runs short on any comprehensive 
solutions, scientists and international delegates have begun 
considering ocean fertilization and other geoengineering 
measures in conjunction with mitigation efforts as a means to 
solve the climate crisis.3
Geoengineering is a broad category of “engineered 
interventions” designed to combat and counteract the effects 
of climate change.
 
4  The Royal Society provides a 
comprehensive definition: “the deliberate large-scale 
manipulation of planetary environment to counteract 
anthropogenic climate change.”5  While geoengineering 
approaches are incredibly varied, they all seek to prevent 
temperature rise not by reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
from the source, but by counteracting the effects of these 
emissions.6  Once left to science fiction novels7 and Popular 
Mechanics magazines8
 
 2. See generally Stephen Pacala & Robert Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: 
Solving the Climate Problem for the Next 50 Years with Current Technologies, 
305 SCIENCE 968 (2004). 
, scientists and legal scholars now 
seriously discuss geoengineering as part of the solution to 
 3. See Experts Advocate Geoengineering Research Programme, 9 A WORLD 
OF SCIENCE 1, 11 (2011), available at http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/ 
MULTIMEDIA/HQ/SC/pdf/AWOS_vol9no1_geoengineering.pdf. 
 4. Edward Parsons & Lia Ernst, International Governance of Climate 
Engineering, 14 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 307 (2013). 
 5. See ROYAL SOC’Y, GEOENGINEERING THE CLIMATE: SCIENCE, 
GOVERNANCE AND UNCERTAINTY 1 (2009), available at http://royalsociety.org/ 
uploadedFiles/Royal_Society_Content/policy/publications/2009/8693.pdf. 
 6. See About Geoengineering, INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF 
GEOENGINEERING PROPOSALS (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.iagp.ac.uk/about-
geoengineering.  There are two main branches of geoengineering approaches: 
Carbon Dioxide Removal and Solar Radiation Management. See ROYAL SOC’Y, 
supra note 5, at ix.  While Carbon Dioxide Removal does not reduce Carbon 
Dioxide at its emission source, it does seek to combat climate change by 
reducing carbon dioxide atmospheric concentrations through the use of various 
removal and storage technologies.  See generally id. at 9.  Solar Radiation 
Management, on the other hand, seeks to offset the effects of increased 
greenhouse gas concentrations by altering the ratio of radiation received from 
the sun.  See generally id. at 23. 
 7. See, e.g., H.G. Wells, THE WAR OF THE WORLDS (Heinemann 1898). 
 8. See, e.g., Joanna Borns, Spongelike Air-Capture Gadget Scrubs Away 
Carbon Emissions, POPULAR MECHANICS (Oct. 1, 2009, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/environment/4256184; Jeremy 
Jacquot, Can a Kind of Ancient Charcoal Put the Brakes on Global Warming, 
POPULAR MECHANICS (Oct. 1, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://www.popularmechanics 
.com/science/4297513?click=main_sr. 
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climate change and at the very least to be used as a stopgap 
measure.9
However, policymakers and representatives at United 
Nations climate talks have yet to discuss geoengineering as a 
tool to combat climate change.
 
10  While delegates vigorously 
discuss carbon reduction year after year at the UN Climate 
Change Conference, policymakers have largely treated 
geoengineering as a separate issue.11  Many fear that a 
discussion on geoengineering, let alone basic research on the 
subject, will undermine the current emphasis on reducing 
carbon emissions.12
Delegates have also treated the discussions about climate 
change and geoengineering separately because each option 
poses dramatically different political obstacles.  Climate 
change mitigation remains stalled by the so-called prisoner’s 
dilemma:
 
13 while states would be collectively best off avoiding 
increased global temperatures through global reductions in 
carbon emissions, each individual actor economically benefits 
the most by continuing with its own emissions.14  For an 
effective agreement, all developed nations must agree to 
emission reductions.15
 
 9. See, e.g., David G. Victor et al., The Geoengineering Option, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS (Mar./Apr. 2009), http://agriculturedefensecoalition.org/sites/default/ 
files/file/geo_current_116/116QC_2009_CFR_The_Geoengineering_Option_by_V
ictor_Council_on_Foreign_Relations_2009.pdf. 
  But efforts perpetually stall as 
 10. See Allister Doyle, Geo-engineering Wins Scant Enthusiasm at UN 
Climate Talks, REUTERS (Dec. 2, 2012, 4:57 PM), http://in.reuters.com/article/ 
2012/12/02/climate-talks-geo-engineering-idINDEE8B104720121202. 
 11. See id. 
 12. See Victor et al., supra note 9. 
 13. The prisoner’s dilemma is a game theory model used to illustrate the 
barriers to cooperation in a competitive environment.  The model is typically 
explained through the following scenario: the police interrogate two suspects to 
a crime in separate rooms.  Each is offered the option of confessing to the crime, 
or staying silent and remaining loyal to his partner.  If both suspects remain 
silent, then the police have insufficient evidence for arrest and both suspects go 
free.  But if one cooperates with the police and the other does not, the 
cooperating prisoner receives a substantial reduction on his sentence while the 
loyal accomplice gets the maximum sentence.  Although the suspects are best 
off by remaining silent, the risk of one side defecting typically causes both sides 
to defect, thus putting both suspects in a worse off position.  For more on the 
prisoner’s dilemma and game theory generally, see Avinash Dixit and Susan 
Skeath, GAMES OF STRATEGY (W.W. Norton & Co., 2d Ed. 2004). 
 14. See Stephen M. Gardiner, A Perfect Moral Storm: Climate Change, 
Intergenerational Ethics and the Problem of Moral Corruption, 15 
ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES 397, 400 (2006). 
 15. See Victor et al., supra note 9. 
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individual states worry that economic rivals will strategically 
defect, continue to emit, and reap relative economic benefits.16
Geoengineering, on the other hand, more closely 
resembles nuclear brinkmanship.  While traditional climate 
change solutions require the participation of all parties, 
geoengineering empowers one player to take dramatic, 
irreversible action.  The nations most vulnerable to rising sea 
levels could threaten to implement geoengineering in an 
attempt to force action on emissions reduction.  Similar to the 
nuclear arms race, states with little bargaining power may 
see geoengineering as an opportunity to voice their opinions.  
If willing, one country could act unilaterally to implement 
several geoengineering techniques, manipulating the climate 
globally.
 
17  While a single geoengineering experiment would 
not cause the same level of turmoil as a nuclear test, these 
experiments, if implemented irresponsibly, could result in the 
opposite of their intended effect, causing irreversible damage 
to our atmosphere.18
Unlike nuclear proliferation, some geoengineering 
techniques are so inexpensive that virtually every vulnerable 
country could conduct experiments.
 
19  Expenses are so low 
that wealthy philanthropists and entrepreneurs can 
participate; some already do.20  In no field of geoengineering 
is this truer than in ocean fertilization.21  The technique 
increases carbon uptake in the ocean by supplying nutrient-
deficient regions of the ocean with the nutrients they lack.22  
Adding these nutrients causes phytoplankton blooms where 
ocean life was previously nonexistent.23
 
 16. See id. 
  In theory, the 
 17. See id. 
 18. See id. 
 19. See id. 
 20. See Tracy D. Hester, Remaking the World to Save It: Applying U.S. 
Environmental Laws to Climate Engineering Projects, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 851, 
864 (2011).  Bill Gates has funded more than $4.5 million worth of research in 
climate engineering projects. See Eli Kintisch, Bill Gates Funding 
Geoengineering Research, SCIENCEINSIDER (Jan. 26, 2010, 2:10 PM), 
http://news.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/2010/01/bill-gates-fund.html. 
 21. See Q&A on Ocean Fertilization, UNESCO IOC (October 23, 2012), 
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/natural-sciences/ioc-oceans/single-view-
oceans/news/ocean_fertilization_we_cannot_afford_to_gamble_with_the_ocean/. 
 22. Hugh Powell, Will Ocean Iron Fertilization Work?, 46 OCEANUS 
MAGAZINE 10, 12 (2008), available at http://www.whoi.edu/oceanus/printArticle/ 
do?id=34167. 
 23. Hugh Powell, Fertilizing the Ocean with Iron, 46 OCEANUS MAGAZINE 4, 
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resulting blooms will absorb carbon dioxide from the 
atmosphere, and when the phytoplankton die, their bodies 
will sink to the ocean floor, locking in the carbon dioxide for 
hundreds, if not thousands of years.24
This Comment proposes that nations tackle the dangers 
posed by ocean fertilization experiments together with other 
geoengineering activities, in the context of combatting climate 
change.  Unilateral ocean fertilization merits concern.  
However, regulation of unilateral ocean fertilization should 
not be done at the expense of furthering scientific knowledge 
and rigorous debate on all geoengineering experiments. 
 
Part I of this Comment introduces the scientific concepts 
behind ocean fertilization, its benefits, and its drawbacks.25  
Part II examines the current international framework that 
seeks to regulate and in many cases prohibit ocean 
fertilization.26  Part III provides a recent case study on 
unilateral ocean fertilization and the failure of the 
international community to prevent potentially dangerous 
behavior.27  Part IV identifies the enforcement problem 
arising from addressing ocean fertilization separately from 
other geoengineering and climate change concerns and 
analyzes the gaps in the framework that inhibit the 
prevention of rogue experiments.28  Finally, Part V proposes 
the ratification of a geoengineering protocol to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to more 
effectively combat unilateral geoengineering experiments, 
rather than tackling each geoengineering method 
separately.29
I. OCEAN FERTILIZATION BACKGROUND 
 
While ocean fertilization is just one of many 
geoengineering techniques, it deserves special attention when 
discussing unilateral geoengineering because of its incredibly 
low barriers for implementation.  Ocean fertilization is a 
category within the Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) strand of 
 
5 (2008). 
 24. Powell, supra note 22, at 10.  
 25. See infra Part I. 
 26. See infra Part II. 
 27. See infra Part III. 
 28. See infra Part IV. 
 29. See infra Part V. 
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geoengineering targeted at stimulating primary 
productivity—the production of organic compounds from 
carbon dioxide—in oceans.30  Unlike Solar Radiation 
Management (SRM) geoengineering techniques,31 CDR seeks 
to directly address the source of climate change by reducing 
the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.32  But rather 
than doing so by reducing carbon emissions at their source, 
CDR attempts to remove carbon dioxide that has already 
entered the atmosphere.33  Thus, while CDR does attempt to 
combat the source of climate change directly, it does not 
reduce the anthropogenic source.34
A. Ocean Fertilization Techniques 
  As carbon emissions place 
immense strain on our planet, CDR hopes to pull equally 
hard in the opposite direction to counter the problem. 
All ocean fertilization techniques start with the concept 
of stimulating primary productivity in oceans by increasing 
phytoplankton populations.35  Phytoplankton are autotrophic 
ocean organisms, which absorb carbon dioxide like plants 
through photosynthesis.36  When they die, their carbon-filled 
bodies fall to the depths of the ocean, locking in the carbon, 
potentially for hundreds of years.37
 
 30. See Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Report of the Thirtieth Consultative 
Meeting and the Third Meeting of Contracting Parties, LC 30/16, annex 6, res. 
LC-LP.1 (Dec. 9, 2008) [hereinafter IMO Report res. LC-LP.1] (“[O]cean 
fertilization is any activity undertaken by humans with the principal intention 
of stimulating primary productivity in the oceans.”)  The Intergovernmental 
Oceanographic Commission (IOC) similarly defined ocean fertilization as a type 
of geoengineering based on the purposeful introduction of nutrients to the upper 
ocean to increase marine food production and to remove carbon dioxide from the 
atmosphere. Statement, Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of 
UNESCO, Ocean Fertilization (Oct. 19, 2012), available at http:// 
www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/SC/pdf/IOC_statement_Ocea
n_fertilization.pdf [hereinafter UNESCO Statement]. 
  But phytoplankton are 
 31. Proposed SRM techniques include Stratospheric Sulfur Dioxide 
Injection, Cloud Albedo Enhancement, and Space-based filters and mirrors.  See 
generally William C.G. Burns, Geoengineering the Climate: An Overview of 
Solar Radiation Management Options, 46 TULSA L. REV. 283, 289–96 (2010). 
 32. See ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 5, at 9. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 16. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 9; see Doug Wallace et al. United Nations Educational, Scientific, 
and Cultural Organization, Ocean Fertilization: A Scientific Summary for 
Policy Makers 3 (2011).  Some phytoplankton are eaten by other organisms, 
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not distributed evenly across the ocean.38  Certain ocean 
regions lack significant phytoplankton populations despite 
having many nutrients required for their existence.39  Ocean 
fertilization attempts to turn these “ocean deserts” into 
grounds for rapid increases in phytoplankton populations, 
known as phytoplankton blooms, in order to increase natural 
carbon uptake.40  The most common ocean fertilization 
technique, ocean iron fertilization, offers a fairly simple 
solution to do just that.41  Scientists have discovered that 
adding iron sulfate to so-called “high-nutrient low-
chlorophyll” ocean regions can cause massive phytoplankton 
blooms where ocean life was previously nonexistent.42
While ocean iron fertilization is the dominant field of 
ocean fertilization, there are several other creative 
techniques, many of which target low-nutrient, low-
chlorophyll waters instead.
 
43  These regions require nitrogen 
to stimulate phytoplankton growth.44  A technique proposed 
by the Ocean Nourishment Corporation, an Australian ocean 
fertilization venture, would add nitrogen directly, without 
any iron, by pumping urea from factories through pipelines to 
the edge of continental shelves in tropical and subtropical 
ocean regions.45  Other scientists propose adding phosphorus 
to the released iron mixture.46
 
thus the CO2 would also be stored in marine animal waste.  See Powell, supra 
note 23, at 2. 
  The phosphorus could 
stimulate the bacteria trichodesmium, which converts 
dissolved nitrogen into a usable form, setting off equally large 
 38. See Hester, supra note 20, at 868. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 5, at 16. 
 41. Q&A on Ocean Fertilization, UNESCO IOC (October 23, 2012), 
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/natural-sciences/ioc-oceans/single-view-oceans/ 
news/ocean_fertilization_we_cannot_afford_to_gamble_with_the_ocean/. 
 42. See Melissa Eick, A Navigational System for Uncharted Waters: The 
London Convention and London Protocol’s Assessment Framework on Ocean 
Iron Fertilization, 46 TULSA L. REV. 351, 351 (2010). 
 43. See generally Amy Nevala & Kate Madin, Proposals Emerge to Transfer 
Excess Carbon into the Ocean, 46 OCEANUS MAGAZINE 26, 26–27 (2008). 
 44. See Randall S. Abate & Andrew B. Greenlee, Sowing Seeds Uncertain: 
Ocean Iron Fertilization, Climate Change, and the International Law 
Framework, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 555, 564–65 (2010). 
 45. Nevala & Madin, supra note 43, at 26; see also Our Ocean Solutions, 
OCEAN NOURISHMENT CORP. (2014), http://www.oceannourishment.com/ 
ouroceansolutions/. 
 46. Powell, supra note 22, at 12. 
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blooms.47  Experiments in low-nutrient, low-chlorophyll 
regions open new areas for ocean fertilization and prevent the 
stripping of nutrients from surface waters often caused by 
traditional ocean iron fertilization experiments.48
Finally, some ocean fertilization experiments propose 
phytoplankton stimulation without adding any nutrients at 
all.
 
49  Ocean upwelling can deliver underutilized nutrients 
from the deep ocean to the surface, where it can be absorbed 
by phytoplankton in surface water.50 Atmocean, another 
geoengineering corporation, proposes placing long, open 
ended tubes—some as long as 1,000 meters—into the ocean.51  
One-way valves and surface wave action would help drive 
nutrient-rich waters from the deep up to the surface.52  As an 
added benefit, upwelling would also bring cooler waters up to 
the warmer surface waters and potentially reduce hurricane 
intensity.53  Atmocean also plans to generate cheap energy 
from the wave action for island nations eager to sponsor the 
projects.54
B. Appeals of and Concerns About Ocean Fertilization 
 
Ocean fertilization has gained interest because of its 
relative simplicity and low cost, but several risks and 
uncertainties leave scientists cautious.  Compared to loftier 
geoengineering experiments requiring new infrastructure or 
undeveloped technology, ocean fertilization often can be 
implemented with existing resources.  The chemical used in 
ocean iron fertilization experiments, iron sulfate, is readily 
available for purchase in bulk at nurseries or online.55
 
 47. Id. 
  A ship 
then drizzles the iron sulfate in a slurry form from behind an 
 48. See Abate & Greenlee, supra note 44, at 564–65.  For more on the 
method proposed by the Ocean Nourishment Corporation, see generally OCEAN 
NOURISHMENT CORP., supra note 45. 
 49. See Nevela & Madin, supra note 43, at 27. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id.  See ATMOCEAN, INC., http://www.atmocean.com/1.html (last visited 
Feb. 9, 2014) (providing information about Atmocean’s Wave 
Energy/Sequestration Technology). 
 52. See Nevela & Madin, supra note 43, at 27 
 53. See Kevin E. Trenberth, Warmer Oceans, Stronger Hurricanes, SCI. AM., 
Jun. 14, 2007, at 44. 
 54. See ATMOCEAN, INC., supra note 51. 
 55. See, e.g., Iron Sulfate Granular, GROW ORGANIC, http:// 
www.groworganic.com/iron-sulfate-granular-50-lb.html. 
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equipped vessel in a slow zigzagging pattern to increase 
dispersion and prevent iron from being wasted by sinking 
before uptake.56  The most significant obstacle to 
implementation is acquiring the proper vessel to conduct the 
experiment.  Most ocean fertilization projects, and certainly 
ocean iron fertilization, occur far beyond coastal waters.57  
Thus, a vessel capable of high-seas voyages is required to 
carry out the project.  Finally, even those with a commercial 
purpose in mind will likely need recording equipment to 
measure the efficacy of the experiment.58
Because most resources are readily available, ocean 
fertilization is substantially cheaper than other 
geoengineering methods.  Even with full implementation, 
geoengineering techniques generally are a fraction of what 
the cost would be to prevent climate change through reduced 
emissions.
 
59  While ocean fertilization may be relatively 
inexpensive and simple to implement, scientists have raised 
serious concerns about its effectiveness.  Substantial scientific 
uncertainty exists as to whether carbon sequestration will 
actually occur.  Early models showed that ocean iron 
fertilization in the Southern Ocean alone could erase one-to-
two billion tons of carbon emissions per year, or about ten-to-
twenty-five percent of the world’s total emissions.60  However, 
small-scale scientific experiments have cast doubt on these 
figures.61  Experiments show that only a small percentage of 
absorbed carbon will likely fall to the seafloor where it has 
the potential to remain for millennia.62  Up to fifty percent 
may reach middle-depth waters, where it could remain for 
several decades, but the remainder would return to the 
atmosphere.63
Additionally, many scientists are concerned about ocean 
fertilization’s secondary effects.  Nearly every CDR method is 
likely to significantly affect delicate ecosystems where the 
technology is deployed.
 
64
 
 56. Powell, supra note 22, at 12. 
  Often, a risk analysis is necessary 
 57. Eick, supra note 42, at 362. 
 58. See Powell, supra note 23, at 9. 
 59. See Parsons & Ernst, supra note 4. 
 60. See Powell, supra note 23, at 4. 
 61. Id. at 6–7. 
 62. Id.  
 63. Id. at 4. 
 64. See Hester, supra note 20, at 866. 
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to determine whether the consequences are acceptable given 
the larger crisis at hand.65  A 2009 International 
Oceanographic Commission (IOC) publication concluded that 
large-scale fertilization projects could have unintended, 
unpredictable impacts over an extensive area and for an 
extensive period of time.66  One concern is that the 
decomposition resulting from phytoplankton could cause large 
die-offs across a marine ecosystem by consuming oxygen at 
lower depths.67  Further, when decomposed nutrients swell 
back from the deep ocean to the surface, thousands of 
kilometers away and years after the original fertilization, 
their introduction could start a reaction resulting in the 
releases of nitrous oxide and methane.68  These potent 
greenhouse gasses could substantially exceed the amount of 
carbon dioxide equivalents the phytoplankton originally 
sequestered.69
Proponents argue that ocean fertilization comes with 
benefits beyond carbon uptake.  Phytoplankton blooms could 
restore phytoplankton levels previously damaged by ocean 
acidification and replenish fish stocks decimated by 
overfishing.
 
70  But many scientists argue that experiments 
could have the opposite effect.71  The unique balance between 
phytoplankton, bacteria, and other nutrients present in the 
water where nutrients are deposited can create different 
ecological winners and losers.72  Some combinations of 
variables may lead to an increase in fish populations, but 
others may cause spikes in jellyfish or toxic algal blooms, 
which could have irreversible negative impacts on fish 
stocks.73
 
 65. See Gareth Davies, Framing the Social, Political, and Environmental 
Risks and Benefits of Geoengineering: Balancing the Hard-To-Imagine Against 
the Hard-To-Measure, 46 TULSA L. REV. 261, 266–68 (2010). 
 
 66. See Wallace et al., supra note 37, at 9. 
 67. See id. at 16. 
 68. See id. 
 69. See id.; Eick, supra note 42, at 358. 
 70. Eick, supra note 42, at 357; see Jessica Marshall, Rising Ocean Acidity 
May Deplete Vital Phytoplankton, DISCOVERY NEWS (Jan. 14, 2010), 
http://news.discovery.com/earth/phytoplankton-iron-ocean-acidity.html?print 
=true.  
 71. See Hugh Powell, What Are the Possible Side Effects?, 46 OCEANUS 
MAGAZINE 14, 14 (2008). 
 72. See id. 
 73. See id. 
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A final barrier to ocean fertilization is the difficulty in 
measuring the resultant carbon sequestration.  Any plan to 
sell sequestered carbon would require a reliable accounting, 
which becomes particularly difficult in the ocean.74
II. CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Largely because of the uncertainty surrounding ocean 
fertilization techniques, the international community has put 
in place a moratorium on current experiments until the risks 
can be more accurately assessed.75  However, rather than 
create a new geoengineering or ocean fertilization treaty that 
could provide legitimacy to the geoengineering movement, 
states have sought to create and implement a legal 
framework using existing treaties.  The legal framework for 
ocean fertilization has largely grown out of two international 
agreements, both of which did not originally intend to target 
any methods of geoengineering, let alone ocean fertilization.  
These two treaties are the London Convention and Protocol,76 
which seeks to ban dumping of waste into the ocean, and the 
Convention on Biological Diversity,77 which, as its name 
suggests, seeks to preserve the planet’s biological resources.  
The United States has passed domestic laws to implement 
the goals of these treaties, but the goals of this domestic 
framework did not include geoengineering research.78
A. The London Convention/Protocol and The Convention on 
Biological Diversity 
 
The 1975 Convention on the Prevention of Marine 
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, known as 
the London Convention, was one of the first treaties to 
 
 74.  See Powell, supra note 23, at 6. 
 75. See, e.g., UN Decision Puts Brakes on Ocean Fertilization , NATURE 
NEWS (June 3, 2008), available at http://www.nature.com/news/2008/080603/ 
full/453704b.html.  
 76. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Convention on the Prevention of Marine 
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 26 U.S.T. 2403 (Dec. 29, 
1972), available at http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/ 
Pages/Convention-on-the-Prevention-of-Marine-Pollution-by-Dumping-of-
Wastes-and-Other-Matter.aspx [hereinafter London Convention].  
 77. Convention on Biological Diversity art. 1, Jun. 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 
79, available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1992/06/19920605%2008-
44%20PM/Ch_XXVII_08p.pdf [hereinafter Convention on Biological Diversity]. 
 78. See Marine Protections, Research, and Sanctuaries Act, Pub. L. No. 92-
532, 86 Stat. 1052 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401–1444 (1994)). 
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provide for environmental protection of the oceans.79  
Administered by the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) since 1977,80 the Convention requires contracting 
parties to “control” and “prevent” pollution of the sea by the 
dumping of waste.81  The Convention defines dumping as the 
“deliberate disposal at sea of wastes or other matter from 
vessels . . . at sea”82 and contains a list of forbidden materials 
to be dumped.83  The Convention also contains an exception 
for matter placed in the ocean “for a purpose other than the 
mere disposal thereof, provided that such placement is not 
contrary to the aims of” the Convention.84  The Convention 
was originally ratified to prevent countries from disposing 
their land waste, sewage, and hazardous materials out at 
sea.85
In 1996, forty-two States party to the Convention adopted 
the London Protocol to modernize and eventually replace the 
London Convention.
 
86  The Protocol, which entered into force 
in 2006, places more stringent requirements on contracting 
parties.87  The Protocol requires contracting parties to 
“prevent, reduce, and wherever practicable eliminate 
pollution caused by dumping.”88  But rather than enumerate 
what it forbids, the Protocol contains a “reverse list” 
designating allowable materials to dump, while prohibiting 
the dumping of everything else.89
 
 79. London Convention, supra note 76; see also Eick, supra note 42, at 364; 
THE LONDON CONVENTION AND PROTOCOL: THEIR ROLE AND CONTRIBUTION TO 
PROTECTION OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT, INT’L MARITIME ORG., available at 
http://www.imo.org/blast/blastDataHelper.asp?data_id=21278&filename=LC-
LPbrochure.pdf. 
  While the Protocol’s reverse 
list is much more comprehensive, the Protocol’s relevance 
 80. London Convention, supra note 76. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at annex I. 
 84. Id. at art. III. 
 85. See London Convention Background, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME 
ORGANIZATION, http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Environment/SpecialProgrammes 
AndInitiatives/Pages/London-Convention-and-Protocol.aspx (last visited Oct. 29 
2013) [hereinafter London Convention Background]. 
 86. London Convention, supra note 76. 
 87. See id. 
 88. Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by 
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, Nov. 7, 1996,, 36 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter 
London Protocol]. 
 89. London Convention, supra note 76. 
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remains limited because only forty-two States are party to it, 
roughly half the number of States that signed the original 
convention.90
The second international treaty relevant to the 
regulation of ocean fertilization is the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, or CBD.  Opened for signature in 1992,
  The Convention and Protocol work together, 
and are collectively known as the LC/LP. 
91 
the CBD stated three goals: (1) conservation of biological 
diversity; (2) sustainable use of its components; and (3) fair 
and equitable sharing of benefits arising from genetic 
resources.92  Among other obligations, the CBD requires 
parties to identify, regulate, and manage “processes and 
categories of activities which . . . are likely to have significant 
adverse impacts on the conservation and sustainable use of 
biological diversity, and monitor their effects.”93
Despite neither convention intending to combat ocean 
fertilization, parties to both instruments began to express 
concern about ocean fertilization shortly after an 
unannounced ocean iron fertilization experiment cast 
international attention on the viability of unilateral action.
 
94  
In July 2007, the Scientific Groups of the LC/LP submitted a 
“Statement of Concern” regarding ocean iron fertilization.95  
The statement concluded that knowledge on the effectiveness 
and potential environmental impacts of ocean iron 
fertilization was currently insufficient to justify large-scale 
operations.96  In November 2007, the Parties to the 29th 
London Convention meeting endorsed the Scientific Group’s 
“Statement of Concern.”97  They agreed that ocean iron 
fertilization, and ocean fertilization more broadly, falls within 
the scope of the LC/LP.98
 
 90. See London Convention Background, supra note 85. 
  The parties recognized that each 
State could consider proposals on a case-by-case basis, but 
 91. History of the Convention, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 
http://www.cbd.int/history/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2014). 
 92. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 77. 
 93. Id. at art. 7(c), art. 14. 
 94. See Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Report of the Twenty-Ninth Consultative 
Meeting and the Second Meeting of Contracting Parties, at 4, LC 29/17 (Dec. 14, 
2007); Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Adoption of the Agenda, annex I, para. 2.2, 
LC/SG 31/1/1 (Jan. 18, 2008). 
 95. See G.A. Res. 62/215, ¶ 97, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/215 (Mar. 14, 2008). 
 96. See id. 
 97. See London Convention, supra note 76, at 4. 
 98. Id. at 5. 
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urged States to “use the utmost caution” when considering 
proposals for large-scale ocean fertilization operations.99
In May 2008, parties to the CBD voiced even stronger 
caution against ocean fertilization activities.
 
100  The ninth 
meeting of the Conference of the Parties agreed to decision 
IX/16, identifying large-scale ocean fertilization as an activity 
likely to have adverse effects on biological diversity.101  The 
Conference of the Parties, recognizing the scientific and legal 
analysis of the LC/LP, urged States to ensure that ocean 
fertilization activities “do not take place until there is an 
adequate scientific basis on which to justify such activities.”102  
While the statement was strongly worded, it did acknowledge 
the need for legitimate scientific research into actual 
outcomes and the effectiveness of ocean fertilization.103  To 
promote this goal, the decision provided an exception to its 
recommended moratorium for scientific research.104  However, 
the exception was only extended to “small-scale scientific 
research studies within coastal waters.”105  The inclusion of 
the “coastal waters” language effectively rendered the 
exception nonexistent because nearly every effective ocean 
iron fertilization experiment takes place outside of coastal 
regions.106
 
 99. Id. 
  Further, even if a scientific experiment could be 
classified as small-scale and within coastal waters, the CBD 
concluded that such experiments should be authorized only 
under four other conditions: (1) the experiment must be 
specific as to what type of data would be gathered and the 
acquisition of this data would be justified given any perceived 
risks, (2) the experiment should be “subject to a thorough 
prior assessment of the potential impacts of the research 
studies on the marine environment,” (3) the experiment 
should be “strictly controlled,” and (4) the experiment should 
not be used in carbon markets or for any other commercial 
 100. See U.N. E.P. Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, Rep. on its 9th Meeting, May 19–30, 2008, UNEP/CBD/COP/9/29, 
annex I (Oct. 9, 2008). 
 101. Id. 
 102. See id.; Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 77. 
 103. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 77. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See Eick, supra note 42, at 362. 
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purpose.107
In October 2008, at the thirtieth Consultative Meeting of 
the Contracting Parties to the London Convention, the 
Parties agreed to resolution LC-LP.1 seeking to regulate and 
limit ocean fertilization experiments.
 
108  The Contracting 
Parties reaffirmed that the scope of the London Convention 
and Protocol includes ocean fertilization activities,109 defined 
as “any activity undertaken by humans with the principal 
intention of stimulating primary productivity in the 
oceans.”110  Given the then-present state of knowledge, the 
Contracting Parties concluded that ocean fertilization other 
than for legitimate scientific research should not be 
allowed.111  Any large-scale ocean fertilization activities would 
be considered contrary to the aims of the LC/LP112 and would 
not fall within the Convention’s exception for placement of 
matter into the ocean for a purpose other than mere disposal 
thereof.113  Finally, Contracting Members agreed to develop 
an assessment framework to assess on a case-by-case basis 
whether to approve scientific research proposals.114
The first test of this international framework came in 
2009, when the Alfred Wegener Institute in Germany 
coordinated with Indian researchers to conduct an iron 
seeding experiment, known as LOHAFEX (Loha translates to 
iron in Hindi, FEX stands for Fertilization Experiment), in 
the Southern Ocean.
 
115  Unlike in previous ocean fertilization 
research experiments, the LOHAFEX scientists submitted 
their proposal for approval to the German government.116
 
 107. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 77. 
  
Emphasizing the LC/LP and CBD’s recognition of the need for 
 108. See IMO Report res. LC-LP.1, supra note 30, at annex 6. 
 109. See G.A. Res. 63/111, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/111 (Feb. 12, 2009). 
 110. IMO Report res. LC-LP.1, supra note 30, annex 6.  This definition is 
broad enough to cover all types of fertilization and possibly upwelling. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Eick, supra note 42, at 366; Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Report of the 
Thirty-First Meeting of the Scientific Group of the London Convention and the 
Second Meeting of the Scientific Group of the London Protocol, LC 31/16, § 2 
(Jul. 7, 2008) [hereinafter IMO Report of the Thirty-First Meeting]. 
 113. IMO Report res. LC-LP.1, supra note 30, at annex 6. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See Quirin Schiermeier, Ocean Fertilization Experiment Suspended, 
NATURE NEWS (Jan. 14, 2009), http://www.nature.com/news/2009/090114/ 
full/news.2009.26.html; see generally Press Release, Alfred-Wegener Inst., 
LOHAFEX: An Indo-German Iron Fertilization Experiment (Jan. 13, 2009). 
 116. See Abate & Greenlee, supra note 44, at 585–86. 
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further scientific research, the LOHAFEX team claimed its 
proposal complied with international guidelines.117  Despite 
the claim, it was uncertain whether the plan to deposit six 
tons of dissolved iron sulfate fell within the term “small-
scale,” which was not defined by the CBD decision.118   It was 
nearly unquestionable that the experiment was not in 
“coastal waters,” though the team argued that it fulfilled the 
requirement because the location was “downstream from an 
extensive land mass” and the waters contained “coastal 
plankton species.”119
Basing its decision on these requirements, the German 
Environmental Ministry concluded the experiment would not 
comply with the CBD decision.
 
120  The Bureau of the 
Conference of the Parties to the CBD noted that the 
responsibility to implement COP decisions was left entirely to 
the parties at the national level.121  Recognizing the confusion 
between the standards of the CBD and LC/LP decisions, the 
German Ministry of Research reversed the German 
Environmental Ministry’s decision and allowed the 
experiment to proceed.122
Since the confusion surrounding the LOHAFEX 
experiment, the CBD has moderated its position to align more 
closely with the requirements of the LC/LP resolution.  In the 
2009 Scientific Synthesis on Ocean Fertilization, the 
Secretariat acknowledged the need for “legitimate scientific 
research,” but insisted that any research comply with an 
international assessment framework.
 
123
 
 117. See id.; ALFRED WEGENER INST., RISK ASSESSMENT OF THE LOHAFEX 
EXPEDITION 2 (2009), available at http://www.awi.de/fileadmin/user_upload/ 
News/Selected_News/2009/LOHAFEX/0%20AWI_NIO_LOHAFEX_Risk_Assess
ment.pdf. 
  In 2010, Parties to 
the LC/LP finalized this assessment.  During their October 
 118. Abate & Greenlee, supra note 44, at 586. 
 119. Id. at 556–57. 
 120. Id. 
 121. BUREAU OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON 
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, Minutes of the Meeting of the Bureau of the Conference 
of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity Held in Nairobi, on 13 
February 2009, at 7–8, UNEP/CBD/COP/Bur/2009/1/3 (Feb. 13, 2009), available 
at http://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/cop-bureau/cop-bur-2009/cop-bur-2009-02-
13-minutes-en-pdf. 
 122. Abate & Greenlee, supra note 44, at 588. 
 123. SECRETARIAT OF THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, NO. 45, 
SCIENTIFIC SYNTHESIS OF THE IMPACTS OF OCEAN FERTILIZATION ON MARINE 
BIODIVERSITY 9 (2009). 
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11–15, 2010 consultative meeting, the London Convention 
issued resolution LC-LP.2 along with the Assessment 
Framework.124  The document describes the four steps of the 
framework: (1) the initial assessment, (2) environmental 
assessment, (3) decision making, and (4) results of 
monitoring.125  In 2010, the CBD again expressed strong 
caution against all geoengineering projects, but acquiesced to 
the LC/LP assessment framework for ocean fertilization 
projects.126
B. Domestic Implementation of the International Legal 
Framework 
 
The London Convention additionally requires States 
party to the Convention to implement domestic law to fulfill 
the goals of the convention.127  In the United States, that 
domestic law is the Marine Protection, Research, and 
Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA, or the “Ocean Dumping Act”).128  
Congress passed the MPRSA in 1972, prior to the London 
Convention, and provided amendments two years later to 
make it consistent with the treaty obligations under the 
London Convention.129
The MPRSA seeks to “prevent or strictly limit the 
dumping into ocean waters of any material which would 
adversely affect human health, welfare, or amenities, or the 
marine environment, ecological systems, or economic 
potentialities.”
 
130
 
 124. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], On the Assessment Framework for Scientific 
Research Involving Ocean Fertilization, annex 6, res. LC-LP.2 (Oct. 14, 2010). 
  The Act specifically forbids: (1) any person 
who departs from the United States from transporting 
material for the purpose of dumping, (2) a United States 
 125. Id. 
 126. Convention on Biological Diversity Draft Decision, 10.L36, § 8(w), Sess. 
10, Oct. 18–29, 2010, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/10/L.36 (Oct. 29, 2010); 
Convention on Biological Diversity Draft Decision 10.L42, §§ 59, 60, Sess. 10, 
Oct. 18–29, 2010, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/10/L.42 (Oct. 29, 2010). 
 127. London Convention, supra note 76. 
 128. Marine Protections, Research, and Sanctuaries Act, Pub. L. No. 92-532, 
86 Stat. 1052 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401–1444 (1994)). 
 129. Id. (as originally enacted); Act to Amend the Marine Protection, 
Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 93–254, 88 Stat. 50 (1974); 
see also Charles B. Anderson, Ocean Dumping and the Marine Protection, 
Research, and Sanctuaries Act, 1 LOY. MAR. L.J. 79, 84 (2002).  Additional 
amendments were made in 1977 and 1988.  Id. at 85, 87. 
 130. 33 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1994). 
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vessel (or aircraft) from transporting material for the purpose 
of dumping, regardless of the point of departure, and (3) any 
person from dumping material within the territorial sea or 
the contiguous zone of the United States.131  Any person 
violating the Act is liable for a civil penalty of up to $50,000 
for each violation.132  Additionally, any person who knowingly 
violates the Act is subject to a criminal fine, imprisonment for 
up to five years, or both.133  The Act also contains a citizen’s 
suit provision.134
While the Ocean Dumping Act is fairly expansive, it does 
include a permit exception.  The EPA may issue permits for 
the transportation of material for the purpose of being 
dumped into the ocean where the agency determines that the 
dumping “will not unreasonably degrade or endanger human 
health, welfare, or amenities, or the marine environment, 
ecological systems, or economic potentialities.”
 
135  Criteria for 
permit requests are outlined, but considerable discretion is 
left to the agency.136  Among the list of material absolutely 
banned from ocean dumping are radiological, chemical, and 
biological warfare agents, and high level radioactive 
wastes.137  Further, the EPA has also identified several 
categories and circumstances in which no permit is required, 
including the dumping of fish wastes, the placement of 
materials for the purpose of maintaining fishery resources, 
the discharge from vessel propulsion, and in case of 
emergency, dumping material to safeguard life at sea.138
Within the several types of permits, the EPA codified the 
issuance of research permits in specific circumstances.
 
139
 
 131. Id. § 1411; see also GERARD J. MANGEONE, UNITED STATES ADMIRALTY 
LAW 269 (1997); Anderson, supra note 129, at 83. 
  The 
 132. 33 U.S.C. § 1415(a). 
 133. Id. § 1415(b).  Any person criminally convicted must forfeit to the United 
States any property derived from the proceeds of any violation, and any 
property that was used to commit or facilitate the commission of the violation.  
Id. 
 134. Id. § 1415(g). 
 135. Id. § 1412.  In the case of dredged material, the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers has jurisdiction to decide whether to issue a permit rather than the 
EPA.  See Administering the Ocean Dumping Act, EPA JOURNAL, Jul./Aug. 
1975, available at http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/administering-ocean-dumping-
act (last updated Feb. 26, 2013). 
 136. See id.; 40 C.F.R. § 227 (2012). 
 137. See Administering the Ocean Dumping Act, supra note 135. 
 138. See 40 C.F.R. § 220.1(c). 
 139. Id. § 220.3(e). 
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EPA can issue a research permit for dumping materials as 
part of a research project if “the scientific merit of the 
proposed project outweighs the potential environmental or 
other damage that may result from the dumping.”140
When the MPRSA was first passed, Congress was mostly 
concerned with two forms of ocean waste.  The first was the 
dumping of sewage waste into the ocean.
 
141  Around the time 
of its passage, some coastal communities were struggling to 
find capacity in land-based waste disposal sites, and were 
turning toward the oceans to dispose of the waste.142  The 
second concern was the dumping of highly toxic materials 
resulting from the Cold War Era: radioactive waste and 
chemical and biological warfare agents.143  In fact, the 1972 
pre-amendment version of the MPRSA centrally focused on 
banning the dumping of these types of waste.144 Today, the 
MPRSA is largely used to prevent the dumping of dredged 
material removed from navigation channels.145  Other 
materials commonly dumped include fish wastes, human 
remains, and abandoned vessels.146  This type of dumping is 
typically allowed once the EPA or the Army Corps of 
Engineers issues an appropriate permit.147
III. A PARADIGM: RUSS GEORGE AND THE NATION OF THE 
HAIDA PEOPLE 
 
Concern over unilateral geoengineering is likely to 
increase over the years due to the convergence of several 
factors.  First, as the international discussion about climate 
change continues to stall, the countries most greatly affected 
by rising tides may turn to unilateral experiments to stall 
climatic disaster, or at least to keep climate change in the 
 
 140. Id. 
 141. S. Rep. No. 92-451, at 11 (1971). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 12, 18.  
 144. See Marine Protections, Research, and Sanctuaries Act, Pub. L. No. 92-
532, § 101, 86 Stat. 1052 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401–1444 (1994)). 
 145. Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act Compliance 
Monitoring, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/oecaerth/ 
monitoring/programs/mprsa/ (last updated July 13, 2013). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Ocean Dumping, US. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/type/ 
oceb/oceandumping/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2013); see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 229.1 
(burial at sea), 229.2 (target vessels), 229.3 (transportation and disposal of 
vessels). 
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headlines.148  The likelihood of action is exacerbated when 
actors are convinced that not taking action on climate change 
would be worse than implementing scientifically uncertain 
geoengineering techniques, even if such action comes with the 
reprimand of the international community.149  Second, while 
scientific understanding of geoengineering’s risk has been 
slow to develop, further understanding of its implementation 
allows actors to feel more comfortable implementing 
experiments even while scientific uncertainty exists.150  And 
third, private corporations that have found limited success in 
using carbon markets to profit from geoengineering activities 
may begin turning to nations with less political power as a 
source of funding.151
As discussed above, international legal regimes—
specifically, the London Convention and the Convention on 
Biological Diversity—have begun to take action on 
geoengineering activities, but these decisions have come 
through legal instruments not initially designed to tackle 
issues related to climate change.
 
152  The current legal 
framework is likely to cause a halt on scientific research, as 
demonstrated by the caution taken by the LOHAFEX 
experiment.153
Unilateral ocean fertilization sponsored by government 
actors is not a conceptual problem.  In July 2012, Californian 
entrepreneur Russ George and his crew dumped over one 
hundred tons of iron sulfate into the Pacific Ocean, two 
hundred nautical miles out from the Canadian archipelago of 
Haida Gwaii.
  But the regime is unlikely to have any impact 
on unilateral ocean fertilization taken for non-scientific 
purposes. 
154
 
 148. See Victor et al., supra note 9. 
  The unprecedented experiment produced a 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. See supra Part I. 
 152. See, e.g., Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 
Sept. 16, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3 (being used to prevent stratospheric sulfur 
injection experiments). 
 153. See supra Part I.A. 
 154. UNESCO Statement, supra note 30; see also Martin Lukacs, World’s 
Biggest Geoengineering Experiment ‘Violates’ UN Rules, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 
15, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/oct/15/pacific-iron-
fertilisation-geoengineering; see generally HAIDA SALMON RESTORATION 
COMPANY, http://www.hsrc1.com/. 
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phytoplankton bloom over 10,000 square kilometers in size.155  
In comparison, scientists have previously conducted thirteen 
ocean fertilization experiments involving the deposition of 
iron,156 but the largest of those released only six tons.157  
George’s endeavor completely nullified these previous 
experiment’s efforts of moderation.  Further, the scientific 
community and the EPA were completely unaware of the 
project; news of the experiment did not break until several 
months later, in October.158  George completed the Haida 
Gwaii dump with a budget of merely 2.5 million dollars.159
The project implicated several different states.  Mr. 
George secured funding for his project by petitioning the local 
village counsel of the Haida, an indigenous nation in British 
Columbia.
 
160  Under George’s persuasion, the town of Old 
Massett established the Haida Salmon Restoration 
Corporation (HSRC).161  The First Nations town council 
agreed to the project after being told it would restore local 
salmon populations.162  HSRC hoped to recoup their 2.5 
million dollar investment by generating and selling carbon 
offsets from the dump.163 According to the HSRC CEO, the 
Canadian government had been repeatedly notified of the 
experiment.164  The Canadian government is currently 
investigating the project.165
 
 155. See id. 
  Finally, HSRC also borrowed 
research equipment from the U.S. National Ocean and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), though those 
 156. See Eick, supra note 42, at 356.  
 157. Press Release, Alfred-Wegener Inst., supra note 115. 
 158. See Lukacs, supra, note 154.  
 159. Peter O’Neil & Dene Moore, Ottowa Attacks Haida’s ‘Rogue Science’ 
Experiment, VANCOUVER SUN (Oct. 30, 2012), http://www.canada.com/ 
vancouversun/news/westcoastnews/story.html?id=ae0e928a-fe46-43a1-bc61-
5dbfaa554bf8. 
 160. See Lukacs, supra note 154. 
 161. See Our Story = Ancient Wisdom + New Science, HAIDA SALMON 
RESTORATION CORPORATION, http://www.hsrc1.com/history/our-story/. 
 162. Q&A on Ocean Fertilization, UNESCO IOC (October 23 2012), 
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/natural-sciences/ioc-oceans/single-view-
oceans/news/ocean_fertilization_we_cannot_afford_to_gamble_with_the_ocean/; 
UNESCO Statement, supra note 30; see also Lukacs, supra note 154.  
 163. O’Neil & Moore, supra note 159. 
 164. See Martin Lukacs, Canadian Government ‘Knew of Plans to Dump Iron 
into Pacific, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 17, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
environment/2012/oct/17/canada-geoengineering-pacific?intcmp=122. 
 165. Id. 
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responsible may have misled the NOAA about the 
experiment.166
This was not Russ George’s first attempt at such an 
experiment; his ocean fertilization engineering efforts began 
over a decade ago with “Planktos.”
 
167  George’s first 
experiment had limited resources: in 2002, he conducted an 
experiment by purchasing bags of red ochre pigment from the 
Hoover Paint Company and dragging them from behind a 
borrowed schooner.168  His team of researchers recorded the 
results, but it is unclear and unlikely they had the scientific 
tools to measure the experiment properly.169  After working to 
create a strong public image, donating carbon offsets to the 
Vatican170 and being recognized by Nature Magazine,171 
Planktos acquired resources to engage in a larger 
experiment.172  In August 2007, Planktos planned to release 
one hundred tons of iron ore dust near the Galapagos 
Islands.173  In response, Greenpeace established a permanent 
patrol vessel in the area to intercept and halt any iron release 
by Planktos.174
The current legal framework on ocean fertilization, 
rooted in solving the previous century’s environmental 
problems, will likely be unable to keep up with the creativity 
of men similar to Russ George.
 
175
 
 166. Keven Drews, Haida Gwaii Village, Company, Legal Counsel to Defend 
Controversial Iron-Dumping Ocean Project, THE VANCOUVER SUN (Oct. 19, 
2012), http://news.newenergytimes.net/2013/04/08/u-s-businessman-takes-first-
nation-people-for-2-5-million/. 
  During the Planktos 
Galapagos incident, environmental groups filed a petition 
with the EPA asking the agency to intervene and halt the 
 167. Living on Earth: Iron Fertilization, PUBLIC RADIO INTERNATIONAL 
(2003), available at http://www.loe.org/series/series.html?seriesID=27. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Doug Struck, Carbon Offsets: How a Vatican Forest Failed to Reduce 
Global Warming, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Apr. 20, 2010), http:// 
www.csmonitor.com/Environment/2010/0420/Carbon-offsets-How-a-Vatican-
forest-failed-to-reduce-global-warming; see also, New Energy Times, 2007 – 
Russ George Publicity Stunt – Giving the Vatican Non-Existent Carbon Credits, 
YOUTUBE (Apr. 24, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cET-u899iJc& 
feature=gv&hl=en. 
 171. Living on Earth: Iron Fertilization, supra note 167. 
 172. See Hester, supra note 20, at 861. 
 173. See id. 
 174. Id., at 862. 
 175. See Eick, supra note 42, at 360–61. 
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experiment under authority granted by the MPRSA.176  But 
Planktos carefully planned the event to evade the scope of the 
MPRSA.177  Because of jurisdictional limits, the Act forbids 
dumping only by a person departing from the United States, 
sailing under a United States flag, or by dumping within the 
territorial sea or contiguous zone of the United States.178  By 
using a vessel sailing under a foreign flag and not having a 
record of the place of departure, Planktos ensured that the 
EPA could do little to prevent the experiment.179
George has thus far avoided any legal challenges to the 
Haida Gwaii experiment.  Prior to the project becoming 
public, Canadian enforcement officials commenced an 
investigation into the experiment, but they have not 
commenced an action against George.
 
180  The 
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO 
(IOC) released a statement condemning the project as a 
violation of multiple international conventions.181  But George 
called the moratoria on ocean fertilization projects a 
“mythology” and claimed that they do not apply to his 
project.182
IV. THE EFFICACY OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
International action has been particularly vigilant in the 
field of ocean fertilization.183
 
 176. Hester, supra note 20, at 886. 
  Bans have been placed on 
nearly all experiments, but these barriers may have little 
impact on those trying to “prove a point,” or, possibly in the 
future, nations that feel they have nowhere else to turn.  
Further, the ban has done little to help scientific progress 
that could illuminate the benefits and dangers of ocean 
fertilization.  The discussion on what research should be 
allowed has been wholly separate from the debate on how to 
 177. Id. 
 178. 33 U.S.C. § 1411 (1994). 
 179. Hester, supra note 20, at 886. 
 180. Martin Lukacs, US Businessman Defends Controversial Geoengineering 
Experiment, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 19, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
environment/2012/oct/19/geoengineering-canada?INTCMP=SRCH. 
 181. UNESCO Statement, supra note 30.  The IOC has worked closely with 
Parties to several international instruments currently discussing ocean 
fertilization, including the Convention on Biological Diversity and the London 
Convention and Protocol.  Id. 
 182. Lukacs, supra note 154. 
 183. See Eick, supra note 42, at 361–76. 
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confront the issues of climate change.184
The stated goal of the CBD and LC/LP resolutions and 
the LC/LP Assessment Framework was to allow monitored 
small-scale research while preventing experiments without a 
legitimate scientific purpose.
  As a result, 
negotiations largely continue to ignore ocean fertilization and 
geoengineering as a solution to climate change, despite 
changes in scientific knowledge. 
185
The Assessment Framework attempted to legitimize 
small-scale ocean fertilization as a worthwhile scientific 
endeavor.
  But, in reality, the results of 
the international framework seem to have accomplished the 
opposite.  Since the Assessment Framework, there have been 
no additional peer-reviewed scientific experiments.  Yet, Russ 
George ignored the moratorium and carried out a 
scientifically ill-equipped experiment twenty times larger 
than any previous scientific experiment.  
186  Nevertheless, the end result of the Assessment 
Framework specifically, and recent international action 
generally, raised bureaucratic barriers to research 
experiments while failing to provide any incentives for an 
increase to the research desperately needed for accurate risk 
analysis.  The CBD and LC/LP ban on all larger experiments 
fails to allow any type of risk assessment that could more 
accurately weigh the benefits of scientific knowledge against 
potential environmental impacts.  As a result, the current 
legal framework could deter legitimate scientific groups from 
conducting responsible experiments that could provide vital 
information.187
At the same time, the Assessment Framework has 
changed little to nothing for private actors.  The problem with 
the strict standards created by the CBD and the LC/LP is 
that unilateral actors can unilaterally ignore them.  While the 
language of the CBD strongly admonishes commercial ocean 
 
 
 184. See Doyle, supra note 10. 
 185. See IMO Report res. LC-LP.1, supra note 30;  Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], 
On the Assessment Framework for Scientific Research Involving Ocean 
Fertilization, annex 6, res. LC-LP.2 (Oct. 14, 2010); U.N. E.P. Conference of the 
Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Rep. on its 9th Meeting, May 
19–30, 2008, UNEP/CBD/COP/9/29, annex I (Oct. 9, 2008); Convention on 
Biological Diversity, supra note 77. 
 186. See Eick, supra note 42, at 355–56. 
 187. See Eick, supra note 42, at 373–74. 
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fertilization enterprises, its language is toothless.188  The 
recent decisions of the Contracting Parties to the CBD are 
entirely discretionary and impose no legal restrictions.189  
Similarly, the LC/LP Assessment Framework is also non-
binding.190
The response to the Haida Gwaii project thus far is 
evidence of the powerlessness of the current international 
framework.  Ironically, news of the Haida Gwaii dump broke 
during the eleventh meeting of the Conference of the Parties 
to the CBD.
  While the LC/LP Assessment Framework does 
seek a worthy goal of prohibiting experiments that lack a 
legitimate scientific purpose, it is highly unlikely that a group 
conducting such a project would even consider itself subject to 
the voluntary Assessment Framework.  Instead, the 
Assessment Framework leads to undesired and unintended 
consequences: First, scientific groups are delayed in or 
prevented from conducting beneficial experiments as they 
work their way through the Assessment Framework process.  
Second, zealous actors see the lack of progress by scientific 
groups as evidence of political gridlock on the issue and 
justification for advancing irresponsible projects.  In the end, 
the international community loses authority over the issue. 
191  With all members assembled as the story 
unfolded, the Contracting Parties could do no more than 
renew its precautionary stance toward all climate-related 
geoengineering activities and release a statement 
condemning the experiment.192  The Contracting Parties to 
the London Convention and Protocol held a joint meeting just 
a few days later.193  The Parties agreed to a statement of 
concern specifically addressed to the Haida Gwaii 
experiment.194
 
 188. See Ralph Bodle, Geoengineering and International Law: The Search for 
Common Legal Ground, 46 TULSA L. REV. 305, 314 (2010). 
  In it, the Parties reiterated their positions as 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 320. 
 191. Lukacs, supra note 154. 
 192. See UNESCO Statement, supra note 30. 
 193. Haida Gwaii Iron Dumping Hot Topic as Nations Negotiate 
International Geoengineering Treaty, CALGARY HERALD (Oct. 28, 2012), 
http://www.timescolonist.com/news/haida-gwaii-iron-dumping-hot-topic-as-
nations-negotiate-international-geoengineering-treaty-1.22800. 
 194. International Concern over Ocean Fertilization Receives Unanimous 
Backing from Key Meeting in London – 2012, INT’L MARITIME ORG., available at 
http://www.imo.org/blast/blastData.asp?doc_id=14525&filename=J-
14%20Rev.doc. 
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stated in LC-LP.1 and LC-LP.2, pressing for legitimate 
scientific proposals to comply with the Assessment 
Framework.195
Aside from the shunning of these international 
instruments, little action has been taken against Russ 
George.  Because the CBD decisions and the LC/LP are 
unenforceable against private actors, the success of 
preventing unapproved unilateral ocean fertilization projects 
depends on the effectiveness of domestic frameworks.  But 
enforcement of the U.S. domestic framework and the similar 
frameworks of other nations also provide few signs for 
optimism.  The United States’ domestic implementation of the 
London Convention, the MPRSA, is successful in preventing 
ocean fertilization projects in the territorial waters of the 
United States.
 
196
Even in situations where the private actor is an 
American citizen, the MPRSA has limited jurisdiction that 
allows unilateral actors to strategically craft projects to fall 
outside its scope.
  Nevertheless, the MPRSA alone cannot 
prevent ocean fertilization experiments around the globe. 
197  Where the EPA has not authorized a 
permit, the MPRSA forbids any person from departing the 
United States with material intended to be dumped, 
regardless of where the dumping is to occur, and forbids any 
United States vessel from transporting material for the 
purpose of dumping.198  It also prevents any vessel from 
dumping within United States waters.199  This third 
circumstance rarely applies to ocean dumping because most 
experiments take place far away from coastal waters.200  The 
first two circumstances could apply where the dumping 
occurs in high seas.201
 
 195. Id. 
  But the MPRSA does not apply if a 
vessel not flying under the United States flag departs from 
outside the United States, even if the entire crew of the ship 
 196. See Marine Protections, Research, and Sanctuaries Act, Pub. L. No. 92-
532, 86 Stat. 1052 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401–1444 (1994)). 
 197. See Hester, supra note 20, at 886. 
 198. 33 U.S.C. § 1411 (1994); see also MANGEONE, supra note 131; Anderson, 
supra note 129. 
 199. 33 U.S.C. § 1411; see also MANGEONE, supra note 131; Anderson, supra 
note 129. 
 200. See Eick, supra note 42, at 362. 
 201. See 33 U.S.C. § 1411. 
BRANSON FINAL 5/16/2014  5:57 PM 
2014] OCEAN FERTILIZATION REGULATION 189 
is American.202
The 2007 Planktos experiment is a perfect example: 
when the EPA warned that Planktos’ actions could violate the 
MPRSA, Planktos responded to the EPA that it would not be 
flying under a U.S. flag, departing from a U.S. harbor, or 
dumping into the contiguous zone of the United States.
 
203  
Even though Planktos and its founder Russ George are based 
in California, the EPA lacked jurisdiction to enforce the 
MPRSA.204
Because the MPRSA does not have jurisdiction over Russ 
George’s experiment, Canadian law is the only option left to 
penalize Russ George and his team.  Since Canada is a 
Contracting Party to the London Convention, it is also 
obligated to implement domestic law to prevent ocean 
dumping.
 
205  The Canadian enforcement, part 7 section 3 of 
the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, has provisions 
similar to that of the MPRSA.206  Thus, to have jurisdiction, 
Canadian enforcement officials would need to prove Russ 
George sailed under a Canadian vessel or departed from a 
Canadian port.207  It has yet to be seen whether Canada will 
properly enforce its obligations against those involved in the 
Haida Gwaii experiment.  According to information on 
George’s website, on March 27, 2013, Environment Canada 
issued a search warrant and seized evidence at the HSRC 
office,208
The Haida Gwaii project would be even more difficult to 
enforce had Canada not been a party to the London 
 but no arrests have been made. Until and unless 
Canadian enforcement officials take action against Russ 
George, George will see no consequences as a result of his 
experiment. 
 
 202. 33 U.S.C. § 1411. 
 203. Hester, supra note 20, at 886. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Canada ratified the London Convention on November 13, 1975. Int’l 
Maritime Org. [IMO], Status of the London Convention and Protocol, LC 34/2, 
annex 1 (Jul. 19, 2012) [hereinafter IMO Status Report LC 34/2]. 
 206. Canadian Environmental Protection Act, R.S.C. 1999, c. C-32, pt. 7, § 3. 
 207. See id. 
 208. Russ George, EC Raid Swarms Village Science Office with 
Overwhelming Force, RUSSGEORGE.NET (Mar. 30, 2013), http://russgeorge.net/ 
2013/03/30/swat-team-swarms-village-science-office-with-overwhelming-force/; 
see also Canadian Environmental Authorities Seize Evidence from Russ George, 
NEW ENERGY TIMES (Apr. 10, 2013), http://news.newenergytimes.net/2013/ 
04/10/canadian-environmental-authorities-seize-evidence-from-georges-offices/. 
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Convention.  The LC/LP Assessment Framework remains 
limited to the eighty-seven States party to the Convention,209 
and to the forty-two States party to the Protocol, most of 
which are already members of the Convention.210  If private 
actors are looking to avoid the requirements of the LC/LP, 
they may attempt to launch operations from a non-
contracting party, or with a Contracting Party that poorly 
enforces the domestic laws it is obligated to create under the 
London Convention.211  Further, nations that will be critically 
impacted by climate change, including Indonesia, 
Bangladesh, and India, are party to neither the London 
Convention nor its Protocol.212
V. PROPOSAL: CREATING A COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK 
  These nations could ignore 
any ocean fertilization experiments, or could become state 
sponsors of experiments. 
The international framework on ocean fertilization 
established by parties to the CBD and LC/LP has flaws 
beyond the frameworks jurisdictional reach.  The CBD and 
LC/LP fail to consider the motivation of private actors of 
unilateral ocean fertilization experiments, and therefore fail 
to address these motivating factors.  By attempting to combat 
ocean fertilization separately under treaties designed solely 
to protect the environment, the CBD and LC/LP have 
divorced ocean fertilization and geoengineering from the 
larger discussion on climate change.  Delegitimizing ocean 
fertilization’s role in solving the global climate crisis leaves 
advocates with no avenue other than to pursue haphazard 
projects. 
The more appropriate venue to address geoengineering 
experiments and ocean fertilization—a venue that could move 
forward on scientific consensus and more effectively deter 
 
 209. See London Convention and Protocol, INT’L MARITIME ORG., 
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Environment/SpecialProgrammesAndInitiatives/P
ages/London-Convention-and-Protocol.aspx. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Eick, supra note 42, at 366. 
 212. See IMO Status Report LC 34/2, supra note 205, at annex 1 (listing the 
parties to the London Convention); OVERVIEW OF CONTRACTING STATES,  
1996 PROTOCOL TO THE LONDON CONVENTION 1972, INT’L MARITIME ORG.  
(May 28, 2012), available at http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Environment/ 
SpecialProgrammesAndInitiatives/Pages/London-Convention-and-Protocol.aspx 
(follow “42 Parties” hyperlink) (Parties to London Protocol). 
BRANSON FINAL 5/16/2014  5:57 PM 
2014] OCEAN FERTILIZATION REGULATION 191 
private actors—is the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC).  Adopted in 1992, the 
UNFCCC was designed to act as a jumping point for future 
protocols.213  Several protocols, including the Kyoto Protocol, 
have already been ratified through the UNFCCC.214
Additionally, a protocol under the UNFCCC could more 
effectively deter private actors.  Private actors conceivably 
have three motives to pursue.  First, private actors attempt to 
develop scientific knowledge to fill the gap created by the lack 
of legitimate scientific experiments in ocean fertilization.
  Parties 
to the UNFCCC should take advantage of this framework to 
address geoengineering.  Creating a protocol through the 
UNFCCC is more beneficial than the current system for 
several reasons: First, the UNFCCC can more readily make 
decisions that encompass the larger mission of combating 
climate change, rather than viewing ocean fertilization and 
other geoengineering methods as simply an environmental 
hazard.  Second, more states have ratified the UNFCCC, so 
its protocols can be more widely discussed and adopted.  
Third, a proposal through the UNFCCC would take 
advantage of the Convention’s enormous scientific capacity 
embodied in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), and would be more likely to build a process that 
explores scientific validity and placates concerned nations 
and private individuals considering moving forward with 
ocean fertilization projects. 
215  
Second, private actors seek profit by trading carbon credits.216  
Third, private actors strive to keep discussions on climate 
change in the news and in political dialogue.217
 
 213. See Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change: A Commentary, 18 YALE J. INT’L L. 451, 493–96 (1993). 
  The 
 214. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, art. 3(3), Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) [hereinafter Kyoto 
Protocol]. 
 215. See Frequently Asked Questions About Ocean Fertilization: What Are 
Climos Near Term Plans, CLIMOS, http://www.climos.com/faq.php#8 (last visited 
Feb. 11, 2014). 
 216. See Hugh Powell, Dumping Iron and Trading Carbon, 46 OCEANUS 
MAGAZINE 22, 24 (2008); see also Frequently Asked Questions About Ocean 
Fertilization: What is Climos’ Funding/Business Model, CLIMOS, http:// 
www.climos.com/faq.php#8 (discussing regulatory carbon markets as a financial 
incentive). 
 217. Arguably, this was a motivating factor in the Haida Salmon Restoration 
Corporation sharing the news of their experiment at the risk of prosecution.  
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international framework developed by Parties to the CBD and 
the LC/LP largely ignores all three motives in its attempt to 
prevent non-scientific experiments.218
A. Creating a Forum for Legitimate Scientific Experiments 
  Because the CBD and 
LC/LP have goals unrelated to climate change, they are ill-
equipped to address these motivating factors.  The UNFCCC, 
on the other hand, could more readily address these three 
motives because of the significant framework that already 
exists to address these issues. 
For geoengineering techniques to be considered as a 
viable option, substantially more scientific knowledge is 
needed to determine whether they work.219  Based on current 
research, it is impossible to determine whether the 
implementation of geoengineering techniques outweigh their 
risks.220
Unfortunately, the tone set by Parties to the CBD and 
the LC/LP discourages all ocean fertilization projects, 
including those with scientific value.
 
221
Private actors like Russ George seize upon this lack of 
scientific progress as justification for its radical action: if the 
international scientific community refuses to take ocean 
fertilization seriously, the future of the planet requires 
  While both the CBD 
and LC/LP recognize the need for increased scientific 
knowledge on geoengineering techniques, the instruments 
have no intention to promote the growth of this knowledge.  
By placing harsh requirements on those who follow the legal 
framework without providing any incentives, the Assessment 
Framework discourages scientific progress. 
 
See Martin Lukacs, World’s Biggest Geoengineering Experiment ‘Violates’ UN 
Rules, THE GUARDIAN (October 15, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
environment/2012/oct/15/pacific-iron-fertilisation-geoengineering; see generally 
HAIDA SALMON RESTORATION COMPANY, http://www.hsrc1.com/. 
 218. The CBD stated in its most recent resolution that carbon credits should 
not be generated by geoengineering experiments, but action was not 
substantively taken to close off carbon markets. 
 219. See Victor et al., supra note 9. 
 220. See Davies, supra note 65, at 262. 
 221. As the Latin American Director of the ETC Group stated after the CBD 
COP10 meeting, “[a]ny private or public experimentation or adventurism 
intended to manipulate the planetary thermostat will be in violation of this 
carefully crafted UN Consensus.”  Stephanie Dearing, Convention on 
Biodiversity Imposes Moratorium on Geoengineering, DIGITAL JOURNAL (Oct 30, 
2012), http://digitaljournal.com/article/299588.  
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financially capable actors to intervene and conduct research 
themselves.  If legitimate research teams conduct fewer 
legitimate scientific experiments, unilateral experiments 
could become the only means to collect data.  Even projects 
which opponents claim are entirely focused on profit attempt 
to collect scientific data to legitimize their practice.222
Creating an international framework that supports 
scientific research would help eliminate uncertainty and 
allow for better risk assessment.  Providing a structure for 
increasing scientific knowledge on ocean fertilization 
experiments, and all geoengineering methods, would 
eliminate the justification for unilateral actors to push 
forward with their geoengineering agenda.  Increased 
understanding of geoengineering options would further 
decrease the risk of countries independently implementing 
geoengineering projects that have been scientifically proven 
to be ineffective.
  
Unfortunately, for-profit experiments are likely to be ill-
equipped compared to scientific experiments. 
223
Not only should barriers to scientific research be reduced, 
projects that pursue scientific understanding and weigh the 
environmental impacts should be rewarded under a 
geoengineering protocol.  The protocol should not 
automatically ban commercial experiments if those 
experiments pursue these same goals in a responsible 
manner.
 
224
Funds should be dedicated to furthering research rather 
than castigating experiments and then arguing not enough is 
known to consider geoengineering.  This funding should be in 
addition to, rather than a reduction from, current scientific 
grants on climate change research.
  Including commercial experiments within the 
protocol will allow these experiments to contribute to the 
climate change community, rather than force them to fight 
against international currents. 
225
 
 222. See Keven Drews, Haida Gwaii Village, Company, Legal Counsel to 
Defend Controversial Iron-Dumping Ocean Project, THE VANCOUVER SUN  
(Oct. 19, 2012), http://www.vancouversun.com/technology/Haida+village+ 
company+legal+counsel+defend+controversial/7415966/story.html (discussing 
Russ George contacting the NOAA to collect data on his experiment). 
  Uncertainty about 
 223. See Victor et al., supra note 9. 
 224. See Abate & Greenlee, supra note 44, at 591. 
 225. See Victor et al., supra note 9 (discussing scientists’ concern that 
advocating for geoengineering research would subtract from existing climate 
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geoengineering and ocean fertilization remains a real 
concern.  The best means to remove this uncertainty is to 
pursue scientific experiments vigorously today.  Conclusive 
results from these experiments can take several years, so it is 
imperative the international community act now before the 
climate change reversal becomes dependent on these 
technologies.226
The UNFCCC is the proper instrument to provide 
funding and a forum for scientific geoengineering 
experiments because it already collaborates with a highly 
respected scientific body and because more nations are party 
to the convention.  The UNFCCC Conferences of the Parties 
already works in collaboration with the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the scientific body that 
seeks to better understand climate change.
 
227  While the 
IPCC does not conduct any experiments,228 it is the best-
equipped scientific body to determine the efficacy of 
geoengineering experiments.  Working Group I of the IPCC 
recently released a report that included a paragraph about 
the lack of knowledge sufficient to make conclusions about 
whether geoengineering methods would be effective.229
B. Closing Carbon Markets to Ocean Fertilization 
  A 
geoengineering protocol under the UNFCCC could create a 
controlled system for necessary scientific research, and could 
direct the funds to the most effective experiments based on 
the recommendations of the IPCC. 
Raising revenue through the generation of carbon credits 
is often discussed as the main motivating factor for private 
actors.230
 
science research grants). 
  Thus, to prevent uncontrolled experiments, it is 
 226. See, e.g., Alister Doyle, Fertilizing Oceans with Iron Dust Helps Sink 
Carbon: Study, REUTERS (Jul. 18, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2012/07/18/us-climate-oceans-idUSBRE86H1EE20120718. 
 227. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), UNITED NATIONS 
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, https://unfccc.int/bodies/body/ 
6444.php (last visited Feb. 19, 2014). 
 228. Organization, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.shtml#.UmA7lVCsim4 (last visited 
Feb. 19, 2014). 
 229. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 
2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 98 (2013), available at http:// 
www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_ALL_FINAL.pdf. 
 230. Powell, supra note 216, at 22–23.  
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essential to close off the availability of carbon credits for 
projects that pose significant uncertainty and could cause 
environmental harm.  The UNFCCC already addresses which 
types of programs do and do not qualify for carbon credits,231
The main goal of the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC was 
to create commitments by developed nations to reduce or 
limit their greenhouse gas emissions.
 
thus it is in the best position to address whether ocean iron 
fertilization should ever qualify, and what qualifications must 
be met if it were to qualify. 
232  Countries that 
committed to limitations or reductions are known as Annex B 
parties.233  But the Protocol also sought to lay the groundwork 
for market-based mechanisms that would allow parties to 
reach these goals with more flexibility.234  The two major 
mechanisms are emissions trading and the Clean 
Development Mechanism.235
Through international emissions trading, parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol can sell excess carbon units to countries over 
their limits.
 
236  Each developed country party to the Kyoto 
Protocol agreed to “assigned amounts” of carbon in which 
they can emit.237  These levels can be divided into assigned 
amount units (AAUs).238  If an Annex B party uses fewer 
AAUs than it initially agreed to use, the excess AAUs can be 
sold to countries emitting more than their assigned 
amount.239  Carbon can also be traded through removal units 
(RMU) and emission reduction units (ERU).240  RMUs are 
created through land use activities such as reforestation.241 
ERUs are generated when an Annex B party conducts an 
emission reduction or removal project in another Annex B 
country, known as a joint implementation project.242
 
 231. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 214, art. 2.  
 
 232. Id.  
 233. Id., art. 3.  
 234. Id.  
 235. Id., art. 6 (emissions trading), art. 12 (clean development mechanism).   
 236. See International Emissions Trading, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, https://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/ 
mechanisms/emissions_trading/items/2731.php (last viewed Oct. 14, 2013). 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. See Joint Implementation (JI), UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK 
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The Clean Development Mechanism is a system in which 
Annex B parties can undertake green projects in developing 
countries in exchange for certified emission reductions 
(CERs).243  These projects are designed to reduce GHG 
emissions, and developed countries can use this reduction, in 
the form of CERs, to meet emission reduction goals.244  
Further, the projects help to include developing countries in 
the solution for climate change, providing them with 
technological benefits but not imposing any specific emission 
requirements.245
While the mechanisms that generate RMUs, ERUs, and 
CERs provide Annex B parties greater flexibility in reaching 
their emission reductions and limitations, the types of 
projects which qualify to create these “offsets” largely do not 
include ocean fertilization projects.  In initially creating 
regulated carbon markets, the international community was 
cautious about which types of carbon reduction activities 
would be eligible for carbon credits.
 
246  For example, joint 
implementation projects are eligible for ERUs only if they 
meet the definition of “removals by sinks” described in Article 
3, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Kyoto Protocol.247  These 
paragraphs limit the definition of sinks to afforestation and 
reforestation.248 An executive board must approve any new 
types of carbon sinks, which is unlikely to happen in the near 
future for any geoengineering method.249
While the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol already 
substantially address the limitations of carbon credits in 
 
 
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, https://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/ 
mechanisms/joint_implementation/items/1674.php (last visited Oct. 14, 2013). 
 243. Jennifer Morgan, Carbon Trading Under the Kyoto Protocol: Risks and 
Opportunities for Investors, 18 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 151, 157 (2006). 
 244. Id. 
 245. See id. at 159. 
 246. See Powell, supra note 216, at 24.  
 247. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of 
the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol on its First Session, at 2, FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.2 (Mar. 30, 2006). 
 248. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 214, at art. 3. 
 249. Id.; see also Jennie Dean, Iron Fertilization: A Scientific Review with 
International Policy Recommendations, 32 SPG ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 
321. 338 (2008–2009).  For any project to meet eligibility requirements as a 
Clean Development Mechanism, projects would need to demonstrate that the 
reductions are (1) permanent, (2) additional, (3) free of leakage, and (4) 
amenable to monitoring.  These requirements alone pose substantial barriers to 
OIF.  Powell, supra note 216, at 24.  
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international markets, the Protocol and the UNFCCC are 
more limited in their ability to control voluntary markets.  
Since the vast majority of carbon credits are traded on 
regulated markets, the current provisions of the Kyoto 
Protocol already substantially limit the profitability of ocean 
fertilization.250  However, because regulated markets are 
unavailable to geoengineering experiments, private actors 
have turned to private, or voluntary, markets as a means for 
profit.251  Voluntary markets have grown rapidly with the 
increase in public concern and awareness about carbon 
footprints.252  These markets are available for individuals and 
companies who wish to assuage their conscience or green 
their image.253  They impose fewer requirements regarding 
the credits that end up on them, but the credits carry a lower 
sale value than credits available through regulated 
markets.254
Those who wish to profit from carbon credits today may 
have the opportunity to bypass the limitations of the Kyoto 
Protocol by trading on the voluntary carbon trading 
market.
 
255  These voluntary markets have very few rules 
about what types of projects qualify for carbon credits.  
Currently, voluntary markets have hesitated in generating 
carbon credits through ocean fertilization experiments.256  
Because the main buyers on these markets are those looking 
to enhance their green image, internationally condemned 
projects are unlikely to become widely accepted.257
 
 250. See Powell, supra note 216, at 24.  
  
Nonetheless, increasing prices of carbon credits and the hope 
that these markets will open when the theory has a larger 
scientific consensus continues to motivate the commercial 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id.  For examples of voluntary carbon markets, see the Chicago Climate 
Exchange or Terrapass. 
 253. Powell, supra note 23, at 8. 
 254. See KATHERINE HAMILTON ET AL., ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE & NEW 
CARBON FINANCE, FORGING A FRONTIER: STATE OF THE VOLUNTARY CARBON 
MARKETS 2008, at 6 (2008), available at http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/ 
documents/cms_documents/2008_StateofVoluntaryCarbonMarket2.pdf. 
 255. Eick, supra note 42, at 362. 
 256. See Powell, supra note 216, at 24 (“You don’t really sell emission 
reductions from landfills or from oil and gas sector [on the voluntary market].  
What you do sell on the voluntary market is beautiful projects, projects that 
people want to be involved with.”). 
 257. See Powell, supra note 216, at 24.  
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ocean fertilization industry.258
If voluntary markets continue to grow, regulating 
voluntary carbon markets may be necessary to deter for profit 
projects.
 
259
Additionally, a geoengineering protocol under the 
UNFCCC could establish specific guidelines as to what 
projects, if any, would be eligible for carbon credits.  Even if 
the international community reaches the likely conclusion 
that no ocean fertilization experiments are eligible for carbon 
credits, a definitive statement about why ocean fertilization 
and other geoengineering experiments are currently not 
eligible, paired with opportunities for further research, could 
alter the eligibility of carbon credits for ocean fertilization on 
private markets. 
  To ensure that the voluntary carbon market does 
not provide for a means of profit, efforts could be made to 
prevent groups from purchasing carbon credits generated 
from ocean fertilization projects. A geoengineering protocol 
under the UNFCCC could easily include provisions that seek 
to limit the use of unapproved geoengineering methods for the 
generation of carbon credits on voluntary carbon markets.  
Such a provision would likely be uncontroversial and readily 
followed by the voluntary carbon markets seeking a positive 
public image. 
C. Including Ocean Fertilization within the Climate Change 
Dialogue 
While the idea of geoengineering being part of the 
climate change strategy has increased as efforts to mitigate 
climate change have stalled, discussion over ocean 
fertilization by the CBD and the LC/LP was entirely separate 
from the goal to take the most effective action to combat 
climate change.  Because the regulation of ocean fertilization 
has been determined by two international conventions 
focused on environmental hazards, ocean fertilization has 
only been discussed as a hazard rather than a potential 
solution to climate change.  Further, it sets a precedent for 
the international community to regulate other forms of 
geoengineering haphazardly and without comparing or 
 
 258. See Powell, supra note 216, at 22 (“[Economic incentives] will draw the 
interest of entrepreneurs. So even if iron fertilization isn’t profitable now, it 
may be in coming decades.”). 
 259. See Powell, supra note 216, at 23.  
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analyzing the risk of any methods. 
The role of geoengineering in a comprehensive solution to 
climate change has remained largely unanswered.260  The 
focus of the discussion by parties to several international 
conventions was to strongly urge for a greater scientific 
foundation illuminating benefits and drawbacks before 
allowing for widespread implementation of climate 
engineering techniques.261
Many continue to argue geoengineering techniques 
detract from solving the critical problem of dramatically 
reducing emissions,
  The CBD and LC/LP fail to tackle 
the problems of geoengineering as a whole.  By solely focusing 
on the environmental impacts of ocean fertilization projects, 
the CBD and LC/LP cannot facilitate a substantive discussion 
that identifies acceptable geoengineering projects.  Further, 
not including this discussion as part of the comprehensive 
climate change solution frames ocean fertilization and 
geoengineering as unworthy of any discussion. 
262 while others who previously opposed 
climate engineering now seek a strategy utilizing both 
mitigation and climate engineering.263
The practicability of individual geoengineering 
techniques should not be decided ad hoc, separate from the 
larger picture of combatting climate change.  Nor should a 
single method of geoengineering be singled out without 
balancing its effectiveness compared to other geoengineering 
approaches.  Because climate change is an international 
problem, the solution should be discussed as much as possible 
by the parties to the UNFCCC, the cohesive body already 
  These strong 
differences of opinion are exactly why States already 
committed to combating climate change should concurrently 
consider all methods of geoengineering.  Because the CBD 
and the LC/LP analyze ocean fertilization as a problem 
separate from the larger climate change solution, focusing 
solely on preventing harm to the oceans, the opportunity for a 
broader discussion of geoengineering in the climate solution is 
missing. 
 
 260. See Davies, supra note 65, at 261–62. 
 261. See Doyle, supra note 226. 
 262. See Alan Robock, 20 Reasons Why Geoengineering May Be a Bad Idea, 
BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (May/Jun. 2008), available at http:// 
bos.sagepub.com/content/64/2/14.full. 
 263. See Victor et al., supra note 9. 
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formed to tackle these issues, rather than allowing parties to 
unrelated treaties establish different standards for different 
geoengineering techniques. 
CONCLUSION 
Ocean fertilization, like any geoengineering method, 
poses real and unknown risks to our planet.  But so does 
inaction on climate change.  The CBD and LC/LP decisions 
include boiler plate language concluding that research into 
ocean fertilization must be pursued, but also limit channels 
through which to conduct beneficial research. 
The goal of the CBD and the LC/LP to prevent damage 
caused by hazardous dumping is honorable.  But, in reality, 
the efforts fail to comprehensively protect against fringe 
experiments like that of Russ George.  Instead, the CBD ban 
on ocean fertilization and the LC/LP Assessment Framework 
significantly slow the pace of legitimate research and distract 
from a serious discussion about the risks and benefits of 
ocean fertilization and geoengineering methods in combatting 
climate change. 
A geoengineering treaty or protocol offers the best route 
for such a discussion.  The UNFCCC is particularly equipped 
to tackle the problem because it includes nearly every country 
in the world.264
 
 264. Status of Ratification of the Convention, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/ 
convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php. 
 A geoengineering treaty would allow for a 
wide ranging discussion about whether geoengineering 
proposals outweigh the risk they impose.  Further, such a 
treaty would allow for discussion about all methods of 
geoengineering, which would allow States to work together in 
determining which geoengineering techniques should be the 
most rigorously pursued, and which are too dangerous to 
pursue.  Similarly, in the preliminary research stages, States 
could determine how to allocate resources to research most 
economically.  Until nations sit down for real discussions to 
support risk assessments of ocean fertilization experiments, 
rogue environmentalists will likely continue to act as a 
distraction using the lack of international progress as a 
rationale for their actions. 
